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The following text by Ninja Marnau was published on 14.12.2018 in the Tagesspiegel - 
Background Digitalisierung (in a shortened version) under the title "Disclosing security 
vulnerabilities instead of selling them ". It is a reply to an op-ed on the Paris Call. 
 
On 9.12.2018 the Tagesspiegel published the opinion piece "About the myth of the evil 
hacker" (German). In this opinion piece Dr. Sandro Gaycken criticises the "Paris Call for Trust 
and Security in Cyberspace", an international agreement in which the signatory states 
commit themselves, among other things, to comply with voluntary standards for the 
responsible handling of IT security vulnerabilities during peacetime. The agreement, led by 
French President Emmanuel Macron, also calls for government measures to increase overall 
IT security and to disclose discovered IT security vulnerabilities responsibly instead of using 
them as investigation tools and cyber weapons.  
 
Gaycken claims that disclosing security vulnerabilities to software and hardware 
manufacturers does not improve overall security. There would always bugs and 
vulnerabilities and since the "bad hackers" use them anyway, it must also be made possible 
for the "good hackers". Gaycken's depiction of IT security is deeply fatalistic. And false. 
 
First of all, IT security vulnerabilities do not exist in a "darkness of ignorance". They can be 
systematized and evaluated. We also know how and why they occur, both technically and 
economically: Poor or not security-oriented design, cost and time pressure, lack of expertise 
and diligence during development and implementation, growing complexity, networking and 
dependencies, etc. Every day, several hundred research teams worldwide work 
systematically to find and close unknown security vulnerabilities. However, if they succeed, 
they are in a conflict. If they notify the manufacturer of the discovered vulnerability, they 
will at best receive a small financial reward or can write a publication for their scientific CV. 
In the worst case, they receive a reply from the company's lawyer. At IT security 
conferences, however, the researchers are courted by companies that buy critical and 
undisclosed vulnerabilities (so-called "0days") for large sums of money in order to sell them 
on to governments. On this grey market of security vulnerabilities, millions may be 
demanded and paid. 
 
Some of these companies also sell to autocratic and human rights violating states, either to 
monitor their own population or to spy on and attack enemy states. Gaycken writes that 
limiting the offensive IT attack possibilities of European states by disclosing vulnerabilities 
would lead to massively asymmetrical disadvantages compared to more “cybertechnically 
active” states or authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China and the USA. This is as 
platitudinous as it is true. However, this realpolitik arms race should not be the only 
contributing factor in dealing with security vulnerabilities for EU member states. If countries 
like Germany participate in buying security vulnerabilities, they will further fuel this grey 
market and more researchers will decide to sell their results rather than publish them. 
 
Usually, The manufacturers and users remain uninformed about the security vulnerabilities 
that are traded in this way, in order to allow secret services and the military to use the 
vulnerabilities for as long as possible. On average, these secret vulnerabilities remain 
exposed for seven years. Meanwhile, they can also be discovered or bought by criminals and 
anti-democratic states. The probability of discovering the same vulnerability in parallel is 
much higher than one would assume, between 6 and 23%. So while states and criminals 
operate with IT security vulnerabilities, the only ones who are unaware of the vulnerability 
and therefore cannot protect themselves are manufacturers and users. 
 
It is another misconception to believe that the security vulnerabilities would be safe with 
government agencies. These are building blocks for cyber-weapons and therefore attractive 
targets for hackers and insider threats. In recent years, the hacker group The Shadow 
Brokers has published several classified NSA attack tools, including 0day attacks. One of 
these known security vulnerabilities was later exploited for the global WannaCry attack. 
 
The responsible disclosure of security vulnerabilities, on the other hand, can lead to an 
actual increase in IT security in the long term. For example, the "Heartbleed" vulnerability, a 
catastrophic flaw in website encryption, was patched within a week of its disclosure in 2014. 
Within a month, almost half of the half million affected web servers were secured. 
Depending on the media attention given to a security vulnerability, a rapid and 
comprehensive improvement in system security can actually be achieved. 
 
However, the Heartbleed example also shows where there is still room for improvement. 
Since the first month after the disclosure, activity in terms of securing website encryption 
dropped significantly: in 2017, around 200,000 web servers were still vulnerable, including 
14,000 in Germany. Hence, how operators can be better informed and assisted to react 
quickly to known security vulnerabilities is part of our current research at CISPA. Every user 
and operator must become active, use up-to-date software and install security updates as 
soon as possible. For these measures to be effective, however, the government must also 
handle security vulnerabilities responsibly. 
 
The Paris Call calls for nothing more than this responsible conduct. It does not demand 
unconditional or immediate disclosure, but sensible vulnerability management by the 
government. In order for intelligence services and prosecutors to receive information in a 
justified individual case, proverbial "cyber sledgehammers" are required in very few cases to 
crack a nut. In the remaining cases, for which the German Central Office for Information 
Technology in the Security Sector (Zitis) is looking for 0days to equip German prosecutors 
and intelligence services with offensive IT tools, we need rules to decide whether a 
vulnerability is so critical that the manufacturer must be notified and when and how this 
should be done. The Paris Call is therefore an important European declaration against the 
state arms race with cyber weapons, which endangers the security of us all. 
